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Abstract 
 
We report results from a laboratory experiment that allows us to test the incentive 
compatibility hypothesis of hypothetical referenda used in CV studies through the 
public or private provision of information messages. One of the main 
methodological issues about hypothetical markets regards whether people 
behave differently when bidding for a public good through casting a ballot vote 
than when they are privately purchasing an equivalent good. This study tried to 
address the core of this issue by using a good that can be traded both as private 
and public: information messages. This allows the elimination of confounding 
effects associated with the specific good employed. In our case information 
dispels some of the uncertainty about a potential gain from a gamble. So, the 
approximate value of the message can be inferred once the individual measure of 
risk aversion is known. Decision tasks are then framed in a systematic manner 
according to the hypothetical vs real nature of the decision and the public vs 
private nature of the message.  A sample of 536 university students across three 
countries (I, UK and NZ) participated into this lab experiment. The chosen 
countries reflect diversity in exposure to the practice of advisory (NZ) and 
abrogative (Italy) referenda, with the UK not having any exposure to it.  Under 
private provision the results show that the fraction of participants unwilling to buy 
information is slightly higher in the real treatment than in the hypothetical one. 
Under public provision, instead, there is no statistical difference between real and 
hypothetical settings, confirming in part the finding of previous researchers. A 
verbal protocol analysis of the thought processes during choice highlights that 
public provision of information systematically triggers concerns and motivations 
different from those arising under the private provision setting. These findings 
suggest that the incentive compatibility of public referenda is likely to rely more on 
affective and psychological factors than on the strategic behaviour assumptions 
theorised by economists. 
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1 Introduction  
Contingent valuation methods are widely used in nonmarket valuation.  However, CV 
has been criticised for a number of reasons revolving around the issues of credibility 
and reliability of responses. In particular, the potential incentive compatibility of 
hypothetical referendum format is a key element of validity for nonmarket value 
estimates obtained from CV surveys. The aim of this research is to investigate the 
impact of the private vs public nature of the good on the incentive compatibility of 
hypothetical referenda for obtaining estimates of monetary values for nonmarket 
goods and services. One novel aspect of this study is the use of a good which is 
neutral with respect to the public or private provision mechanism. This allows us to 
compare public versus private provision rules and their impact on incentive 
compatibility without suffering the confounding effect on the outcome associated with 
the use of an eminently private good. Such effects have previously detracted from 
otherwise high profile studies. The provision-neutral good used here are information 
messages able to resolve part of the uncertainty of a gamble. Results are of interest 
for applied economists and practitioners working for government agencies that use 
cost-benefit analysis of environmental, health or other public programs.  
The paper is set out as follows. In the first section the research questions and the 
objectives are presented along with a review of the literature and a synthesis of the 
findings to date. The methodology and data collection are illustrated in the second 
section. The analysis of quantitative data is summarised in the third section while a 
qualitative analysis of a verbal protocol from respondents is illustrated in the fourth 
section. Conclusions are drawn in the last section, along with suggestions for further 
research.  
2 Objectives  
Contingent Valuation (CV) is a survey based method employed to elicit respondents’ 
willingness to pay for unpriced goods contingent to the existence of hypothetical 
markets. More than two thousand papers have appeared on the topic and both 
government agencies and international organisations have promoted CV studies 
across over 50 countries (Carson 2000). Despite its wide success as a preference 
elicitation method CV has been criticised for a number of reasons revolving around 
the issues of the credibility and the reliability of responses (Cummings et al. 1997, 
Diamond & Hausman 1993, Green et al. 1998, to name but a few).  
One of the possible drawbacks of the method refers to the incentive compatibility of 
the format used to elicit preferences. Carson & Grove. (2007) showed that only the 
referendum choice format with its binary discrete choices (such as the referendum 
format) can be (but not necessarily are) incentive compatible.  In particular, 
hypothetical surveys can be incentive compatible provided that: 1) respondents 
believe that their answer will affect the actions undertaken by the agency in charge of 
the provision of the good (that is the survey is “consequential”), 2) a “one shot” issue 
voting procedure is adopted. Thus, while for public goods it is possible to make 
people believe that the provision of good will be influenced by the advisory 
referendum results in other cases such as in the provision of new private goods, 
payments cannot credibly be enforced and hypothetical questions related to 
willingness to pay (WTP) are not incentive compatible. 
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However, other authors (Cummings et al. 1995, 1997, Harrison & Rutstrom 2002) 
point out that researchers cannot know in advance whether a respondent to a 
hypothetical survey feels that the outcome of the survey will affect her utility through 
the provision of the good, hence, the consequential nature of the survey must be 
assumed for public goods too.  
Results from the literature that investigates this issue empirically seem unpersuasive 
due to the failure to address the exact research question provided by the theory on 
incentive compatibility. Thus the hypothesis remains, so far, largely inadequately 
tested.  
The incentive compatibility argument in support of CV hypothetical referenda 
provides researchers with several testable hypotheses that, so far, have been 
investigated in settings where confounding factors (such as the nature of the goods 
for which preferences are elicited) often blurred results. One testable hypothesis 
states the lack of incentive compatibility of hypothetical referenda on the provision of 
new private goods vs. the presence of incentive compatibility for public goods. 
Results on tests of this hypothesis would be more persuasive if they were performed 
using a good that could credibly be purchased privately and collectively, while 
maintaining the same private value to individuals. Information messages have this 
desirable property (Hirshleifer & Riley 1992). A message can be acquired privately, 
but becomes a public good as soon as its content is revealed to other people. 
Moreover, information maintains the same private value for each subject under 
different provision rules as it is valuable only indirectly. The ex ante value of 
information messages is given by the expected gain from making informed vs. 
uninformed choices in a game against nature. Furthermore, the value of information 
may be characterised, at least partially, as a ‘homegrown’ value (Cummings et al. 
1995) since in a risky environment, and for a given degree of risk induced by 
researchers, the value depends on the attitudes of respondents towards risk 
(Lawrence 1999). This is, for instance, what is observed in markets for insurance 
(see for example McClelland et al. 1993, for some relevant results). However, attitude 
towards risk is related to the functional form of the elementary utility function. 
Individual utility functions can be investigated by making subjects performing a series 
of choices or stating certainty equivalents in a series of gambles (Becker et al. 1964, 
Davis & Holt 1993, Currim & Sarin 1989, Harrison 1986, Hey & Orne 1994, Camerer 
1995). Assume that the curvature properties of the utility function are sufficiently 
known, than it becomes possible to derive the value of information in a specific game 
setting. More generally, measures of risk aversion of subjects are expected to be 
correlated to the values subjects pose on information messages capable to mitigate, 
at least in part, the uncertainties surrounding the choice task they are facing. This 
may suggest a further test for the demand-revealing properties of the referendum 
mechanism.  
In this study we make use of these concepts and in our study the public provision of 
information is attained within a controlled environment as information messages are 
of no use to participants outside the context of the experiment. Hence, we do not 
expect to observe free riding in the experimental referendum setting.  
The aim of this research is to investigate the impact of the provision mechanism of 
the good (private vs. public) on the incentive compatibility of hypothetical referenda 
while controlling for the perceived consequentiality of the survey. The focus is on 
eliciting values for a good, such as information, that has a double public-private 
nature, thus allowing a way to compare public versus private provision rules and their 
impact on incentive compatibility. A secondary goal is that of using verbal protocol 
5 
analysis of thought lists to identify thought processes systematically associated with 
the two decision settings. 
3 Research design  
The nature of the objective suggests the adoption of a conclusive research design. A 
causal study was designed and undertaken to test the effects of hypothetical vs. real 
choices under private and public provision on the decision to purchase information 
messages.  
Previous testing of the presence of hypothetical bias has largely relied upon valuation 
experiments. Experiments allow a better control of the environmental variables 
enabling researchers to concentrate on the impact of the treatment variable. In this 
case these are the hypothetical vs. real nature of the referendum and the private vs 
the public form of provision.  
We performed a series of valuation experiments drawing upon the protocol used by 
Cummings et al. (1997) as their objectives were similar to ours. However, the nature 
of the good provided required to be changed. In particular, the underlying choice 
setting was a simple two-state of the world, two-message, two-action decision 
problem, similar to that employed by Wendt (1969).  
It is to be emphasised that the hypothetical nature pertains only to the buying or 
selling of information, but not to the outcome of the game to be played, which 
involved participants playing a game for real returns in a one shot context. This 
allowed us to enforce consequentiality with respect to the decision whether to buy or 
not the information message. 
 
Subjects recruitment  
Participants were recruited mainly among undergraduate students of the University of 
York in UK, the University of Firenze in Italy and the University of Waikato at 
Hamilton in New Zealand, either by on-site recruiters or by email and web-
advertisement. Five hundred and thirty six students were recruited in this manner 
almost evenly split across the three Universities. Nine of them did not complete all 
the experimental tasks and were subsequently discarded from the analysis. Of the 
remaining 527, 94 resulted postgraduate or older than 23. Indeed, especially in Italy, 
students on prolongation of their studies are not uncommon and they were difficult to 
identify before they completed their questionnaire. In the econometric analysis of 
data we accounted for this characteristic by means of a dummy variable. 
Each participant was paid 10 pounds, 10 euro or 10 NZ dollars as participation fee 
depending on the location and was told that she (or he) could have had the 
opportunity of doubling the sum in the process of taking part in the experiment. 
The allocation to experimental treatments was random, except for balancing between 
sexes. However, different showup rates sometime resulted in imperfectly balanced 
groups across experimental sessions. The experiment took place in university 
classrooms. All the UK and NZ sessions were located at central campus whereas the 
Italian sessions were split between classrooms in the life science faculty and 
classrooms in the teaching centre for the faculties of medicine, mathematics and 
engineering.  
Following the experimental protocol employed by Cummings et al. (1997) participants 
took part in a market experiments prior to their participation in the core experiments. 
The markets experiments were simple oral double auction whereby units of a generic 
good were traded following the procedure set out by Davis & Holt (1993). The auction 
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served a double purpose. Firstly, it was meant to provide participants with some 
experience in participating in experiments without biasing their response in the core 
section of the experiment. Secondly, as the oral auction takes about 30 minutes to be 
completed, this made participants feel that the participation incentive they were paid 
was worth the time they had to spend attending the experiment.  
After completing the double oral auctions, participants were provided with the 
dichotomous choice exercise on the value of information described in the next 
subsection. The subsequent two phases of the experiments aimed at eliciting a 
measure of risk-aversion and at collecting demographic data through a self compiled 
questionnaire. Risk aversion was elicited through a series of 10 choices between 
paired lotteries following the protocol published by Holt & Laury (2002). Each pair of 
lotteries was composed of a risky (B) and a less risky (A) option. The risky option 
initially provided a payoff of 11.55 pounds (or euro or NZ dollars) with probability one 
tenth and a payoff of 30 pence (or cents) with probability nine tenth. The less risky 
option provided respectively payoffs of 6 and 4.80 pounds (or euro or NZ dollars) with 
the same odd. Only a risk lover would choose the B lottery in the first decision. 
However, along the series of choices the probability of the high payoff in both 
lotteries increases (see table 1) so that subjects were likely to switch from the less 
risky to the risky lottery at some point. The later the switch occurs the more risk-
averse the subject. Thus the switching point provides a measure of risk aversion, 
while the occurrence of more than one switch point signals a low level of 
understanding of the rules of the game or, possibly a somewhat “irrational” 
behaviour.   
 
The design of the experiment 
This part of the experiment aims at investigating whether participants faced with the 
choice to buy a piece of information behave differently depending on whether their 
choice is real or hypothetical, and on whether the information is purchased 
collectively via a referendum decision rule (provided publicly) or purchased privately. 
Therefore the experimental treatments were based on the combination of the levels 
of the following variables:  
 1. rule of provision of information messages (2 levels: private, public),  
 2. form of payment (2 levels: real vs. hypothetical).  
A 4-cell full factorial design was obtained. For each cell 3 experimental sessions 
were replicated at each location, for a total of 24 sessions.  
The underling game for which the information is valuable was framed as a crop 
choice problem. In the game two crops, A and B, give two different returns, 
depending on the prevailing weather conditions, or states (dry or wet). Participants 
were told that although the prevailing state of the world was uncertain, they were 
given the probability—or likelihood—of the occurrence of each state. In addition, they 
had available for a fee a weather forecast which could correctly predict the weather 
condition 75% of the times.  
Thus subjects had to choose between two actions (growing Crop A or Crop B) the 
payoff of which depended on the realization of one out of two possible states of the 
world (wet or dry weather). The payoff matrix was chosen to be symmetric so that 
(Crop A, wet)= (Crop B, dry) = 10 (pounds or euro) and (Crop A, dry) = (Crop 
B, wet) = 0.  
Subjects were then asked to participate in a training trial of the crop choice game in 
which they did not receive any real payment. Prior to participating in the crop choice 
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linked to real rewards, subjects were asked whether they would like to pay a given 
amount for the provision (private or public) of the information service consisting in 
one out of two possible weather forecast messages (“the weather will be dry”, “the 
weather will be wet”). The likelihood of the messages given the state of the world are 
symmetric with Pr(weather is dry | dry)= Pr(weather is wet | wet) = 0.75 while prior 
marginal probabilities (Pr(dry) , Pr(wet)) are equal to 0.5. The price of the message 
was at 2.75 pounds (or euro). This value is 10% higher than ex ante value of the 
message for a risk neutral subject (2.50 pounds or euro) but would be accepted by 
risk averse subjects thereby increasing the role of home-grown values in determining 
the value of information.  
The state of the weather was determined by blindly drawing a ball from a box 
containing an even number of black (wet) and white (dry) balls and placing it in a 
black bag for checking upon request later on. Similarly, whether the message was 
correct or incorrect was determined by drawing a ball from a cage containing 3/4 of 
yellow balls (correct message) and 1/4 of purple balls (incorrect message). 
Participants were shown table 2 to illustrate the likelihood of the message given the 
state of the weather.  
After the information phase the attention of the subjects would be moved to the crop 
decision game that always implied real payments and eventually participated in the 
lottery game and the questionnaire phases described above. 
 
The proposition  
The information service was provided as either a private or a public good. In the 
public provision case participants were to vote and in case of a majority wanting the 
piece of information, a tax was to be collected from all participants in the session and 
the information was made public. In the private setting those who chose to buy the 
information service received it in a sealed envelope and were asked not to divulge its 
content. Following the protocol used by Cummings et al. (1997), participants paid 
real money for the information service in the real treatment while in the hypothetical 
one there was no such payment.  
The dichotomous choice question was framed differently depending on the treatment. 
In the private provision case participants in the real setting were provided with the 
following question:  
We would now like to offer you the opportunity to actually buy the weather forecast 
service at a price of £ 2.75. If you say “yes” then you will have to pay the amount 
right now and you will receive the message in a sealed envelope. You will then select 
the crop which you think is the best (the more profitable) based on the weather 
information. Are you willing to pay £ 2.75 for the weather forecast service?  
Please circle “yes” or “no” when you have made up your mind.  
YES NO 
In the hypothetical setting the question was the same but for (a) the use of the 
conditional tense whenever appropriate (e.g. “you would have to pay”, “you would 
receive”, “would you be willing to pay”) and (b) the first statement that was replaced 
by:  
“We are not actually offering you [. . . ]. However, we are very interested in your 
response to the following question. . . ”.  
In the public provision treatment participants were asked to vote on the following 
proposition:  
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On the proposition: Everyone here in the room will contribute £ 2.75 to the 
experimenter. The contribution is to be used for making available to everyone the 
weather forecast service.  
My vote is  
YES   NO 
Please circle as appropriate when you have made up your mind  
 
In the real setting the proposition was introduced by the following passage:  
“We would now like to offer you the opportunity to actually obtain the weather 
forecast service. We are going to have a secret vote to decide whether or not we will 
do this: all of us pay £ 2.75 for this purpose:  
Proposition  
Everyone here in the room will contribute £ 2.75 to the experimenter.  
The contribution is to be used for making available to everyone the weather forecast 
service.  
If more than 50% of you vote “YES” on this proposition all of you will pay £ 2.75. The 
experimenter will collect £ 2.75 from each of you soon after the vote and then the 
forecast message will be written on the board for all of you to read.  
If 50% or fewer of you vote “YES” on this proposition no one would pay £ 2.75 to the 
experimenter and no forecast will be available to any of you.”  
Even in this case the wording in the hypothetical setting was similar, except for the 
use of the conditional tense where appropriate, and the replacement of the first 
paragraph by the following one:  
“We are not actually offering you the opportunity to obtain the weather forecast 
service. We want you to suppose that we were to have a secret vote to decide 
whether or not we should do this: all of us pay £ 2.75 for this purpose. Supposing that 
we were to have such a referendum we would vote on the following proposition:”  
Participants in the hypothetical treatments were provided separately with both the 
public and the private provision questions to check for consistency in answering 
within a given design. Of course, this was not possible in the real setting. 
 
 The verbal protocol analysis 
A verbal protocol analysis was employed to understand (a) how subjects made sense 
of the questions about the provision of information and (b) whether there were any 
salient and systematic differences across the four treatments. Protocol approaches 
have been used in marketing (Jaeger, 2005) as well as in environmental economics 
(Schkade and Payne, 1994; Svedsater, 2005). In the written version of protocol 
analysis adopted in this study subjects were asked to write down their thoughts about 
the choices they had just made. This thought list technique is “a type of cognitive 
assessment that is particularly useful when one either has no predetermined ideas 
about the cognitive dimensions that are relevant, or has only a few untested 
hunches” (Cacioppo et al. 1999). It is worth noticing that factors of success in the 
thought listing protocol are: 1) answers must come soon after the choice, 2) 
instruction must be clear, 3) participants must respond honestly. That is why 
participants were provided with the form immediately after the information 
purchase/vote decision and before making the final crop decision. In addition, clear 
instructions were provided to increase the precision of answers (for the public 
provision session the statement was modified accordingly):  
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“Just before moving on to choose the final crop, we are interested in everything that 
was going through your mind when you were deciding to accept or refuse the 
hypothetical private purchase (in a sealed envelop) of the weather information.  
Please list these thoughts, whether they are about yourself, the situation and/or 
others; whether they are positive, neutral and/or negative:”  
Since anonymity was assured to participants we assume that they have responded 
honestly. The main themes were then identified by means of content analysis on the 
transcripts of the box content. The coding scheme was partially built taking into 
account previous works on how people make sense of CV questions (Schkade and 
Payne, 1994; Svedsater, 2003). However, the tasks people had to perform in this 
experiment were quite different from those encountered in a CV exercise and an 
inductive approach had to be followed for most of the items. The NVivo qualitative 
data analysis software was used for this purpose.   
 
4 Data Analysis  
The following null hypotheses were retained for the analysis:  
H1: Hypothetical public provision of a good is incentive compatible hence subject 
behaviour, as measured by “yes” responses, is independent of the real or 
hypothetical referendum design.  
H2: Hypothetical private provision of a good is incentive compatible hence subject 
behaviour, as measured by “yes” responses, is independent of the real or 
hypothetical nature of the dichotomous choices about purchasing information with 
private value.  
If both hypotheses cannot be rejected, then this would mean that no difference exists 
in incentive compatibility of hypothetical settings between public and private provision 
formats. If only one hypothesis is rejected this would suggests that the rule of 
provision plays a non-negligible role in determining the incentive compatibility of the 
instrument.  
Experimental data are reported in table 3 and were first analyzed by nonparametric 
tests of difference of response rate under hypothetical and real conditions in order to 
assess the presence of hypothetical bias. The responses are split by the two 
conditions: the type of answer (Yes or No) and the nature of the payments condition 
(hypothetical versus real). A 2 test for independence is employed separately for the 
private and for the public provision cases and results are reported in table 4. In the 
case of public provision 2=1.32 and with one degree of freedom we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of independence of the response rate from the hypothetical or real 
nature of the choice at any level lower than 25%. For the private provision case 2 = 
3.84, hence the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% confidence level.1  
If we take the response rate of the real setting as a proxy of unbiased behaviour then 
we observe that in the private provision case there is a prevalence of No answers 
over Yes ones when the payment is real but not when it is hypothetical. Conversely, 
when information is provided publicly, a larger rate of Yes responses is observed in 
both settings. This evidence seems to support the common assumption that, for 
hypothetical provision of private goods, an upward bias of Yes responses should be 
                                               
1
 Similar results are obtained if data from graduate students are eliminated (tables 5 and 6). However, 
in this case the hypothesis of independence of the response rate from the hypothetical or real setting 
is rejected only at the 7% significance level in the case of private provision of information.  
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observed (Carson & Grove 2007). In hypothetical surveys on the provision of public 
goods potential buyers would untruly answer “Yes” so as to signal the provider a 
larger collective benefit which would in turn enhance the likelihood of provision. 
However, we note that in this experiment the good was quite a peculiar one. 
Information was to be used in a one-shot game and so no such effect can arise as 
the game was not repeated. Therefore, no clear indication on the existence or 
direction of the bias was expected in this case. The slight majority of Yes responses 
observed in the hypothetical private setting might be simply due to the absence of 
budget constrains or other effects due to the desire of safe-guarding personal 
reputation in the group or to warm glow effects. 
A further analysis was carried out by splitting the data across locations. Significant 
differences in response rates arose only for the private real settings where subjects 
in Florence show a higher rate of Yes than in the other two locations (tables 7 and 8). 
Overall the public treatment seems to give rise to more uniform responses. This may 
relate to the fact that in the public provision the overall decision depends on 
preference of other people and possibly common expectation are formed with 
respect to those preferences. 
Some socioeconomic and risk attitude characteristics of the sample are illustrated in 
table 9. Although there does not appear to be major differences in these 
characteristics across treatments two probit models have been estimated to 
investigate the possible impact of demographics variables on the response rate in 
both the private and public provision treatments. Following Cummings et al. (1997), a 
dummy variables is added to the regressors to capture the hypothetical vs real 
setting of the experiment (HYPOTH). The results of the probit analysis are reported in 
table 10.  
The overall regression models are significant at the 5-6% level with only the 
undergraduate dummy showing individual statistical significance. However, in the 
private provision the hypothetical dummy is significant at the 10% level. These 
results are not dissimilar from those obtained by Cummings et al. (1997) for a public 
good but in that case only the treatment dummy (real vs hypothetical) was significant 
and the authors concluded that the null hypothesis of no impact of hypothetical 
setting on the response rate should have been rejected. Conversely, in our case the 
undergraduate dummy in both equations, and to a lesser extent the risk loving 
measure in the public provision, show considerable statistical significance. Moreover, 
in the private setting there appear to be some differences, although only at the 10% 
level of significance, between the hypothetical and real treatments.  
To take into account possible inequality in covariate effects and heteroskedasticity 
across experimental treatments, a sequential test on the joint hypothesis of equality 
of parameters and error variance is performed following the rescaling approach 
proposed by Haab et al. (1999)2. The analysis is performed separately for both the 
private and the public provision of information. 
As we are particularly interested in the difference between hypothetical and real 
treatments, the null is equality of both regression and scale parameters in the two 
conditions: H3 : 








=
=
hyre
hyreH
σσ
ββ
:3   
                                               
2
 For a critical assessment of the Haab procedure see Harrison (2006). 
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Since the scale parameters are unidentifiable under the two different conditions a 
sequential testing procedure is adopted following Haab et al. (1999). Firstly, the 
equality of regression parameter is tested: ( )hyreH ββ =:4  
then, if the previous test fails to be rejected we proceed with testing the equality of 
variances:  ( )hyreH σσ =:5  
H4 implies that the scale parameters re and hy can take on any values. To deal with 
inequality in the scale parameters hy is normalized to 1 and a relative scale factor µ 
is defined as the ratio of the scale parameter for the private treatment on the scale 
parameter for the hypothethical treatment data (µ = re/hy). The relative scale factor 
is estimated through a one dimensional grid search over possible values of µ in order 
to maximise the likelihood of the probit on the data matrix:  








=
hy
re
X
X
X µ   
Once a value for µ is obtained, estimation under H4 is achieved by estimating a 
probit on the data matrix scaled with the likelihood maximizing µ. The alternative to 
H4 being inequality of parameters with no restriction on scale, it is estimated running 
independent probit on the public and private treatment data. A standard likelihood 
ratio test is then employed to test for H4. Tables 11 and 12 provide the necessary 
data respectively for the private and public provision cases. Columns 2 to 5 are 
associated with the rescaling procedure. Columns 2 presents the estimates of the 
pooled sample without the treatment variable HYPOTH. Columns 3 and 4 are the 
estimates of the independent probit over the subsamples of the Real and 
Hypothethical treatment data. Column 5 shows the estimates of the probit estimated 
over the scaled sample under H4 with the optimal µ equal to 0.32 for the private and 
0.50 for the public provision of information. The unrestricted log-likelihood for the LR 
test is given by the sum of the log likelihoods of the independent probits:  
LR1 = −2 × (Lscaledsample − (Lhy + Lre))  
LR1private = −2 × (-180.25- (-88.95 -87.56)) = 8.20 (p=0.15) 
LR1public= −2 × (-172.46 - (-86.01 -85.77)) = 2.61 (p=0.76) 
 The test yields a value lower than the value of 2 statistics at the 5% (2 
.05,5 =11.1) 
level of significance. Thus H4 cannot be rejected at this level of significance. This 
means that the marginal effects of explanatory variables do not vary across condition 
of provision of the information when variance differences between the real and 
hypothetical treatments are taken into account. From our data there is no clear 
evidence that the hypothetical setting impacts on subjects’ responses in both the 
private and public provision case. However, this result is weaker in the private 
provision case.  
Having failed to reject H4, H5 (equality of variance hypothesis) can be tested 
comparing the models in column 2 and 5 of table 8. The log-likelihood function under 
the null is given by the pooled equation (column 2) while the unrestricted 
loglikelihood is obtained by estimating the scaled model (column 5). The likelihood 
ratio statistic can be written as:  
LR2 = −2×(Lunscaledpooled−Lscaledsample), 
LR2private= -2×( -180.61+ 180.25) = 0.73 (p=0.39), 
LR2public=- 2×( -173.10 +172.46) = 1.28 (p=0.26), 
which is to be compared with a critical value of (2
 (.05,1) = 3.84). Even in this case we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality of variances between the hypothetical and 
the real treatment subsamples. Therefore, H3 can not be entirely rejected. The 
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results of our analysis suggest that the distribution of Yes responses under the 
hypothetical setting of information is flatter than that for private provision, although 
not significantly so.  
However, when the original model is re-estimated with scaled data (table13) the 
effect of the hypothetical dummy variable is significant in the private provision case 
while it is not significantly different from zero in the public provision sub-sample. This 
result is not unexpected as a closer examination of tables 11 and 12 reveals that the 
intercept of the real provision equation (column 3) is not significantly different from 
zero (z = 0.21) while the intercept of the hypothetical sample equation (column 4)  
shows a value of the z-statistic close to 2.3 Looking back to the rescaled equation, 
two more variables appear to be significant for the private provision case: the 
undergraduate dummy (UNDERGR) and income (HOU_IN_COR). The former shows 
a negative impact on the probability of obtaining “Yes” responses in the valuation 
question while the income coefficient has the expected positive sign. Conversely, in 
the public provision case no statistically significant coefficient is obtained except for 
the undergraduate dummy that is significant at the 7% level.  
 
5 Results from verbal protocol analysis  
 
In order to shed some light into the motivations that underlie the pattern of responses 
described in the previous section a content analysis was performed on the transcript 
of the thought list boxes described in section 3. Table 14 illustrates the percentage of 
subjects participating in the different treatments that mentioned certain themes 
related to the task of deciding whether to vote Yes or No in the public provision 
treatments or whether to accept to buy the information in a sealed envelope in the 
private treatment.  
The main codes emerged during the content analysis (all mentioned by more than 
10% of the participants in at least one treatment) are described below:  
1. What others do: these are thoughts respondents had about the behaviour of other 
participants. For example: 
“Is the weather forecast correct? What did the others choose? Why did the others want the forecast?” 
[Hamilton, Real,  Public provision] 
These thoughts hint to a social dimension of the choice task in contrast with the 
assumed single agent maximisation problem. There is a slight predominance of 
these thoughts in the public provision setting. 
2. The rules of the game: under this heading we collected all thoughts about the rules 
of the game (such as payments, voting rules, provision in sealed envelop of 
information). One issue raised by some participants was a sort of majority 
dictatorship problem with the ballot vote in the public provision: 
“The fee should be paid only by those who were in favour of the forecast service provision” [Firenze, 
Real, Public provision]  
Apparently, these issues are found more often in the hypothetical rather than in the 
real settings. 
3. Winnings as positional goods: these are considerations among the opportunity to 
obtain larger gains than the other participants by acquiring the information message. 
In other words winnings are regarded as positional goods. For example: 
                                               
3
 This suggests a possibility that the constants could be excluded from the effects of the scale factor 
as in Swait and Louviere (1993).  
13 
“Whilst I felt the information would be important for my predictions I felt I would lose any advantage if 
everyone had the information.  Better that no-one has it than being forced to have to pay for it.” 
[Hamilton, Hypothetical, Private provision] 
4. How others affect me: the code is about how the behaviour of others affect the 
participant either by determining his/her gains or by giving rise to imitative behaviour 
(herding). The influence of others on participants gains may be illustrated by the 
following quotation: 
If less than 50% people vote ‘yes’, then there will be no money to earn, because the chance is 50:50 
and I don’t have to pay for it. [Hamilton, Real, Public provision] 
While an example of imitative behaviour is given by: 
I think that most people will go for having it so I will too [York, Real, Public provision]. 
Not surprisingly, these considerations are more frequent in the public provision 
setting as they naturally relate to a collective decision context. 
5. Altruism, justice and cooperation:  thoughts about moral and ethical issues are 
gathered under this heading. For example: 
 “It is fair that everybody pays for the information message because the message could prove useful to 
everybody” [Firenze, Real, Public provision] 
“I was thinking for myself it just so happened that it would now benefit everyone else.” [York, 
Hypothetical, Public provision] 
“It would be easier to make decisions if some information was available.  Without the information there 
is 50% chance of success but with the information there is 75% chance of success.  The information 
per person would be cheaper [when purchased publicly] than if purchased individually” [Hamilton, 
Hypothetical, Public provision]. 
This kind of considerations arises mostly in the ballot vote and in the hypothetical  
treatments. 
6. Risk: this theme is about subjects referring to gambling or risk avoidance as 
reasons for their choices. For example: 
The weather forecast has 75% accuracy. This is a pretty good accuracy, comparatively. So, I would 
like to use 2.75 pounds to ‘gamble’ in a rather reasonable way. [York, Real, Private provision] 
Real treatments seem to convey this kind of consideration more frequently. 
 7. Probability computation: this theme is about engaging in some sort of more or less 
elaborate computation of the value of the information message (for example trying to 
sorting out what the message would be worth for a risk neutral subject): 
“I thought that 2.75 was good value for a 75% chance of winning 10 pounds. Although now I look back 
and realise its not and its relative to a 50% chance of winning 10.00 pounds and paying nothing.” 
[York, Hypothetical, Public provision]   
8. Budget: this refers to considerations about participants’ own income or reference 
to the incentive given to the subject to make him/her participate in the experiment. 
For example: 
“I said: I am here and they give me 10 euro and I don’t have to pay nothing.  Never mind if I get 7.25 
euro never but I get more chance to reach 17.25 euro” [Firenze, Real, Private provision]  
9. Role playing as farmer: these are thoughts about what a farmer should do 
with a weather forecast and how the information would improve the livelihood of 
farmers: 
“ To generate growth for the crop I want favourable conditions, acquiring as much information as 
possible increases my chances of a successful crop” [Hamilton, Real, Public provision]. 
A number of issues were recalled both in the hypothetical and the real setting under 
public provision. Namely the real vs. hypothetical conditions does not seem to 
discriminate across codes 1, 5, 7 and 9. These are codes that refer to interaction with 
others (1), interdependent utilities (5), rational optimizing behaviour (7) and scenario 
involvement (9). By contrast, under private provision the codes that are observed in 
both hypothetical and real settings and are mentioned by at least 5% of participants 
are: 1, 7, and 8. Apart from code 7 that is in common with the public provision case 
only code 1 and 8 do not discriminate across the real vs hypothetical treatments. 
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Most other codes, that is rules of the game, winning as positional good, altruism 
justice and cooperation and role-playing as farmer are mentioned more often in the 
hypothetical treatments while considerations about chance and risk are raised more 
frequently by those that participated in the real private provision treatments.  
Not surprisingly, the public provision with its referendum mechanism prompted a 
number of thoughts about others, the feelings of being uneasy with a decision taken 
by the majority (rules of the game), possibility of cooperation and concern about 
others’ welfare. All these themes are not related to the computational effort of sorting 
out whether the information message was a good bargain or not (indeed for a 
“rational” risk neutral subject it was not, but only few participants effectively noticed 
it). Such computational issues were slightly more frequent among participants in the 
private provision treatments. 
More interestingly, under public provision of the information message a larger 
number of thoughts are shared across participants in the hypothetical and real 
referenda. This is not the case for the private provision where in the real settings all 
issues mentioned by at least 10% of participants pertain to the structure of the 
economic decision problem: budget constraints, probability computation and risk 
aversion/loving. 
Summarising, it could be argued that in the private provision treatments the 
hypothetical setting triggers a number of thoughts that distract participants’ attention 
from factors that might be reasonably expected to influence willingness to pay. 
Conversely, participants in the ballot vote are influenced by considerations about 
other people in both real and hypothetical settings. These results cast doubts about 
the empirical relevance of the theoretical basis of incentive compatibility for the 
experimental design illustrated in this paper. Rather, the observed consistency 
between hypothetical and real ballot vote outcomes seems to be attributable to this 
common background of thoughts and consideration, background that lacks in the 
private provision case.  
The question that remains open is whether this behaviour is due to the particular 
nature of the good provided, or it is a more general feature of the type of provision. 
Certainly, deciding about an information message that can be used in a one shot 
game is a particular task and requires computational efforts. Moreover, a close 
referendum on small groups is likely to strengthen the perception of interrelationships 
across participants.  
Notwithstanding, the thought list content analysis still shows that a peculiarity exists 
for the public provision and that this peculiarity is strengthened by the hypothetical 
context. Further research is needed to better understand these features of the 
referendum mechanism that seem to be completely unrelated with the suggestion 
that advisory referendum can be incentive compatible if they are perceived as 
consequential.  
6 Conclusions  
This research has implemented well established experimental economics protocols 
adapted so as to unambiguously test for incentive compatibility of the referendum 
format for public and private good provision in hypothetical and real markets, without 
potential confounding due to the nature of the good, which in all cases consisted of 
information messages.  
Our results are mixed. On the one hand in the public provision treatment no 
significant difference was found in the response rate between hypothetical and real 
setting. On the other hand in the private provision treatment results show some 
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effect. Non parametric tests show significant differences between hypothetical and 
real setting with a larger rate of Yes responses in the hypothetical one. The probit 
regression provides borderline results. At the 15% level of significance we were able 
to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients in the real and hypothetical sub-
samples, thus partially supporting the Carson and Groves (2007) hypothesis.   
However, we feel that our findings cannot be simply transposed into the real world of 
CVM practice. The question that remains open is whether the observed behaviour is 
due to the particular nature of the good provided, or it is a more general feature of the 
type of provision. Certainly, deciding about an information message that can be used 
in a one shot game is a particular task and requires computational efforts. 
Furthermore running a referendum decision rule in small groups is likely to 
strengthen the perception of interrelationships across participants. In other words, 
our public provision setting was what Harrison (2006) names a “social choice 
microcosm” in which each participant makes choices that influence directly others. To 
what extent this helps providing a stronger parallelism between the hypothetical and 
the real context is a question that deserves further thought and investigation. 
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Table 1 The ten paired lottery- choice decision 
Option A Option B 
High payoff Low payoff High payoff Low payoff 
value p value p value p value p 
           
6 10% 4.8 90% 11.55 10% 0.3 90% 
6 20% 4.8 80% 11.55 20% 0.3 80% 
6 30% 4.8 70% 11.55 30% 0.3 70% 
6 40% 4.8 60% 11.55 40% 0.3 60% 
6 50% 4.8 50% 11.55 50% 0.3 50% 
6 60% 4.8 40% 11.55 60% 0.3 40% 
6 70% 4.8 30% 11.55 70% 0.3 30% 
6 80% 4.8 20% 11.55 80% 0.3 20% 
6 90% 4.8 10% 11.55 90% 0.3 10% 
6 100% 4.8 0% 11.55 100% 0.3 0% 
                
 
 
 
Table 2 Illustrative example of the sequence of messages 
 
Message True state Correctness 
   
Dry Dry Yes 
Wet Wet Yes 
Dry Wet No 
Dry Dry Yes 
Wet Wet Yes 
Wet Wet Yes 
Dry Dry Yes 
Wet Dry No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3  Unconditional experimental responses 
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Count      
Provision   Real Hypothet Total 
          
Private N 70 54 124 
  Y 64 80 144 
  
Total 134 134 268 
Public N 53 60 113 
  Y 79 67 146 
  
Total 132 127 259 
Response rate    
Provision   Real Hypothet Total 
          
Private N 52 40 46 
  Y 48 60 54 
  
Total 100 100 100 
Public N 40 47 44 
  Y 60 53 56 
  Total 100 100 100 
 
Table 4 Chi squares tests 
 
Chi 
Squar
e  
Chi 
square df 
As, 
Sig. 
     
  Private 3.84 1.00 0.05 
    
      
  Public 1.32 1.00 0.25 
    
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Unconditional experimental responses (undergraduates only) 
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Count      
Provision   Real Hypothet Total 
          
Private N 62 47 109 
  Y 50 62 112 
  
Total 112 109 221 
Public N 39 48 87 
  Y 68 58 126 
  
Total 107 106 213 
Response rate    
Provision   Real Hypothet Total 
          
Private N 55 43 49 
  Y 45 57 51 
  Total 100 100 100 
Public N 36 45 41 
  Y 64 55 59 
  
Total 100 100 100 
 
Table 6 Chi squares tests (undergraduates only) 
 
Chi 
Squar
e  
Chi 
square df 
As, 
Sig. 
     
  Private 3.31 1.00 0.07 
    
      
  Public 1.72 1.00 0.19 
    
      
 
Table 7 Comparison across locations (response rate) 
      Florence York Hamilton Total 
Private Real N 33 55 71 52 
  Y 67 45 29 48 
    Total 100 100 100 100 
 Hypoth. N 49 43 29 40 
  Y 51 57 71 60 
    Total 100 100 100 100 
Public Real N 40 43 36 40 
  Y 60 57 64 60 
    Total 100 100 100 100 
 Hypoth. N 57 49 33 47 
  Y 43 61 67 53 
    Total 100 100 100 100 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
Table 8 Comparison across locations (Chi square tests) 
    
Chi sq. df p 
Private Real 13.16 2 0.01 
 Hypoth. 3.88 2 0.14 
Public Real 0.51 2 0.78 
 Hypoth. 4.47 2 0.10 
 
Table 9 Sample Characteristics 
 
Subject Sample 
Characteristics Real-Priv. Hyp-Priv. 
Real- 
Publ. Hyp.-Pub. Total 
      
MALE 0.53 0.52 0.47 0.50 0.50 
UNDERGR 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.82 
RISK LOV 4.40 4.13 4.10 4.18 4.20 
RIS_REGO 0.84 0.77 0.87 0.80 0.82 
HOU_IN_COR 8838 9370 9795 8265 9075 
 
Note: MALE= is coded (1) male (0) female; UNDERGR is coded(1) undergraduate, (0) others; 
RISK LOV is the number of risky choices (ranging from 0 to 10)in the lottery game, for subject that 
switched more than once the value is replaced by the average of the regular ones ; RIS REGO is 
coded (0) if subject made more than one switch in the lottery game (1) otherwise; HOU_IN_COR is 
the household per capita income (either in pounds or Euro depending on the country): missing 
valued were replaced by sample mean conditional to country where experiments took place and 
responsibility for tuition (self, parents, grants). 
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Table 10 Regression result using the probit model : Provision of information 
 Private provision Public provision 
Variable Coefficient 
z-
Statistic Prob.  
Coefficient z-
Statistic 
Prob. 
    
   
CONSTANT 0.39 1.19 0.23 0.31 0.95 0.34 
HYPOTH 0.28 1.77 0.08 -0.21 -1.32 0.19 
MALE 0.05 0.33 0.74 0.21 1.31 0.19 
UNDERGR -0.49 -2.32 0.02 0.39 1.87 0.06 
RISK_LOV -0.05 -0.88 0.38 -0.09 -1.71 0.09 
HOU_IN_COR 0.02 1.53 0.12 -0.01 -1.01 0.31 
     
  
Mean dependent 
var 0.54   
0.56   
S.D. dependent var 0.5   0.5   
Sum squared resid 63.74   61.2   
S.E. of regression 0.49   0.49   
Log likelihood -179.03   -172.22   
Restr. log likelihood -185.02   -177.42   
LR statistic (5 df) 11.97   10.39   
Probability(LR stat) 0.04   0.07   
       
Obs with Dep=0 124   113   
Obs with Dep=1 144   146   
Total obs 268   259   
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Table 11 Rescaling procedure results: private provision of information 
  
Original 
estimates 
Pooled 
sample 
Real 
sample 
Hypoth 
sample 
Scaled 
Sample 
Scale 
fact.=.32 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
C 0.389 0.557 0.096 0.840 0.416 
 (1.190) (1.786) (0.210) (1.904) (0.959) 
HYPOTH 0.277     
 (1.775)     
MALE 0.053 0.051 0.296 -0.125 0.203 
 (0.331) (0.319) (1.307) -(0.533) (0.947) 
UNDERGR -0.495 -0.506 -0.530 -0.429 -0.641 
 -(2.321) -(2.382) -(1.714) -(1.447) -(2.174) 
RISK_LOV -0.045 -0.052 -0.045 -0.044 -0.060 
 -(0.876) -(1.010) -(0.650) -(0.559) -(0.900) 
HOU_IN_COR 0.016 0.017 0.038 0.001 0.034 
 (1.534) (1.605) (2.097) (0.062) (2.052) 
      
Observation 268 268 134 134 268 
ln(L) -179.03 -180.61 -87.56 -88.95 -180.25 
            
Note: t statistics are reported in parenthesis 
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Table 12 Rescaling procedure results: public provision of information 
  
Original 
estimates 
Pooled 
sample 
Real 
sample 
Hypoth 
sample 
Scaled 
Sample 
Scale 
fact.=.50 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
C 0.315 0.215 0.150 0.292 0.291 
 
(0.954) (0.671) (0.308) (0.661) (0.691) 
HYPOTH -0.210     
 
-(1.318)     
MALE 0.212 0.207 0.338 0.071 0.301 
 
(1.309) (1.282) (1.470) (0.305) (1.467) 
UNDERGR 0.393 0.380 0.450 0.291 0.466 
 
(1.870) (1.810) (1.572) (0.889) (1.801) 
RISK_LOV -0.091 -0.092 -0.078 -0.099 -0.116 
 
-(1.713) -(1.735) -(0.885) -(1.480) -(1.593) 
HOU_IN_COR -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 
 
-(1.011) -(0.886) -(0.775) -(0.533) -(0.885) 
 
     
Observation 259 259 132 127 259 
ln(L) -172.22 -173.10 -85.77 -86.01 -172.46 
            
Note: z statistics are reported in parenthesis 
 
Table 13 Regression result using the probit model : rescaled original estimates 
  Private provision Public provision 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient z-Statistic Prob. 
     
   
CONSTANT 0.31 0.71 0.48 0.32 0.75 0.45 
HYPOTH 0.78 2.16 0.03 -0.15 -0.58 0.56 
MALE 0.21 0.96 0.34 0.30 1.48 0.14 
UNDERGR -0.62 -2.12 0.03 0.47 1.82 0.07 
RISK_LOV -0.05 -0.79 0.43 -0.12 -1.59 0.11 
HOU_IN_COR 0.03 1.98 0.05 -0.01 -0.92 0.36 
      
  
Mean dependent 
var 0.54    
0.56   
S.D. dependent 
var 0.50    
0.50   
Sum squared 
resid 63.74    
61.23   
S.E. of 
regression 0.49    
0.49   
Log likelihood -177.90    -172.29   
        
Obs with Dep=0 124    113   
Obs with Dep=1 144    146   
Total obs 268     259     
 
 
Table 14 Thought list content analysis. Percentage of participants who 
mentioned a specific theme across experimental cells 
 Private Public 
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  Real Hypoth Real Hypoth 
What others do 8 6 12 9 
The rules of the game 1 7 6 12 
Winings as positional goods 1 6 2 10 
How others affect me 3 3 13 6 
Altruism, Justice and Cooperation 1 13 14 24 
Risk 22 9 14 7 
Probability calculus 38 34 27 24 
Budget 22 15 15 7 
Roleplaying as farmer 6 12 11 17 
     
Total number of participants 100 100 100 100 
          
 
 
Table 15 Thought list content analysis. Percentage of participants who 
mentioned a specific theme: Real vs. Hypothetical and  Public vs. Private 
provision comparisons 
 Real Hypoth Private Public All 
  All All All All sessions 
What others do 10 7 7 10 9 
The rules of the game 3 9 4 9 6 
Winning as positional goods 1 8 3 6 5 
How others affect me 8 5 3 10 6 
Altruism, Justice and Cooperation 8 18 7 19 13 
Risk 18 8 15 11 13 
Probability calculus 32 29 36 25 31 
Budget 19 11 19 11 15 
Roleplaying as farmer 8 15 9 14 11 
      
Total number of participants 100 100 100 100 100 
            
 
 
